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Over the past three decades, resear-
chers across different disciplines have 
paid close attention to the development of 
platform markets — an emergent long-
term trend in economic policy. I consider 
platform markets as institutional and tech-
nological systems. Platforms create sys-
tems of rules and mechanisms that stimu-
late agents to adopt, maintain, and imp-
rove standards disseminated by the most 
successful platforms. Similarly to econo-
mic zones and clusters, platform markets 
are two-factor mesoeconomic systems. In 
this article, I consider the differences bet-
ween two-factor systems and traditional 
one-factor groupings (agglomerations, 
industries, and conglomerates). I present 
a general theoretical framework for stu-
dying two-factor mesoeconomic systems, 
which is employed in a comparative 
analysis. A specific feature of platforms is 
the contribution of digital technology to 
the formalisation of relevant external 
effects and institutions, whereas economic 
zones are characterised by the external 
effects of agglomeration and clusters — 
by locally specific effects. Platforms are 
replacing economic zoning and cluste-
ring on the research agenda. 
 
Keywords: platform, platform mar-
kets, platform economy, network effects, 
cluster, conglomerate, local economic 
zone, mesoeconomic system, agglomera-
tion, spatial economics 
 
Introduction 
 
Global platform economy is expe-
riencing an unprecedented growth 
[1]. Since its influence is felt across 
almost all areas of theory and prac-
tice, platform economy has become a 
major challenge for spatial research 
[2], so much so that any spatial theory 
proposed today should be tested for 
compatibility with the observed plat-
form economy phenomena [3—6]. 
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One elegant economic theory of platform markets — multisided plat-
forms — emerged much earlier than platforms received wide attention. 
This, modelling platforms requires few concepts that are truly new. 
Approaches used within game theory, NIE, and industrial organisation 
suffice to describe platform markets, also known as two-sided markets 
[7]. 
However, the effects of deeper-level global technological platforms 
(the Internet and cyber-physical systems) and the dialectic of platform 
market development translate into the emergence of new qualitative ef-
fects, which apparently have not been foreseen by the macroeconomic 
theory. One of such emerging effects is the rise of socioeconomic big 
data, which has provided a solution to the ever-present problem of econo-
mic science, i. e. that of determining and forecasting preferences. 
Since platform markets strongly affect economic development, this 
study aims to analyse the features of platforms as institutional and tech-
nological systems and to compare them with other known and common 
types of mesoeconomic systems. 
The first part of this article will focus on the phenomenon of platform 
market development. I will describe network effects at the heart of 
platform markets, demonstrate the connection between platforms and 
institutions, and identify a number of what I believe to be new 
institutional properties of platform markets. The second part of this 
article will compare platform markets with other types of mesoeconomic 
systems1 — clusters and local economic zones — using tailor-made 
criteria. In conclusion, I will emphasise that, from the perspective of the 
theory of mesoeconomic system development, platform markets are an 
important empirical and theoretical model that complements and 
completes the typology of two-factor mesoeconomic systems. 
 
The theory and practice of platform market functioning 
 
This study will distinguish between platform markets, technological, 
and digital platforms. Figure shows how the three interrelate. 
There is a vast body of national and international research on the 
theory of two-sided and multi-sided platform markets (see, for instance, 
[9—11]). Thus, I will only make a few remarks on the key characteristics 
of these phenomena. 
                                                     
1 Mesoeconomic systems are described as groupings of heterogeneous economic 
agents (as a rule, firms and their environments) [8]. Studies into such groupings 
traditionally faced the problem of institutional formalisation and that of the iden-
tification of external effects creating weak ties within mesoeconomic systems. 
Digital formalisation of institutions provides a new perspective on many of the 
issues tackled by social science scholars. 
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Fig. Technological platforms, digital platforms,  
and platform markets concept overlap 
 
Few researchers disagree that two-sided markets are products of 
network effects between two interconnected markets whose agents use a 
platform to interact. The key distinguishing feature of a platform is that 
the operator sets prices for access for all the agents, i. e. the platform’s 
clients. 
There are different approaches to platform formalisation — those at 
the level of the platform’s markets (1), at the level of the platform’s 
agents (2), and at the level of competition between different platforms 
(3). All of them describe the strategic situation and the external effects of 
(not) joining a group. 
1. In its traditional form, the theoretical game model of a two-sided 
market comprises two interdependent functions of demand for participa-
tion in the platform [12]: 
    , , , ,A A A B B B B Aq D p q q D p q      (1) 
where rq  is the number of agents connected to the platform for markets A 
and B. 
Direct dependence between the parameters Aq  and Bq  in both de-
mand functions is an important element of this model. Platform operators 
control the prices Ap  and Bp . A price increase in any of the markets re-
sults in a network effect, which leads to platform shrinkage. A decrease 
in the prices entails a cumulative effect of the expansion of both markets. 
Platform expansion is limited by the size of agent population. Therefore, 
the process of connecting to the platform can follow an S-curve. Such de-
velopment pattern is characteristic of both technological and institutional 
factors that affect the process in question. 
2. At the level of agents, network effects produce the following theo-
retical game model: 
 ,i iu x n p       (2) 
where iu  stands for the net utility of the i
th agent, p  for the amount char-
ged by the operator for the platform use, ix  for the individual assessment 
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of the th agent’s willingness to participate in the platform (readiness to 
pay), and n for the function that increases as the number of agents con-
nected to the platform grows. 
If the impact of n is excluded, game equilibrium is determined exclu-
sively by the distribution of individual assessments ix . In more comp-
licated cases, population is divided into groups by an agent for whom 
connection to the platform is irrelevant. For such an agent, iu  = 0. Thus, 
.ip x n  While generally there are several equilibria in such games, not 
all of them are stable. 
3. Platform network effects can also be modelled at the level of com-
petition between platforms. For instance, [13] employs the following mo-
del of oligopoly in the market of search service providers: 
,i ii
i i i
z z F
z N
      (3) 
where iz  stands for the quality of the i
th search engine (the quality of the 
search service provided by the platform), iN  is accumulated search his-
tory, which affects the cost of quality production (the greater the number 
of queries, the higher the quality),   is advertising revenue, directly pro-
portional to the number of queries processed by the platform (or its 
market share), and F is fixed costs (investment in the platform creation). 
Network effects are closely linked to the impact of the variable iN . Note 
that this model describes a strategic situation, and whether the platform 
wins depends on the quality of other competing platforms, iz . 
Looking at the models shows how different approaches to interpreting 
and modelling network effects are (for more detail, see [14]). While this 
variety provides a solid theoretical framework for the concept of platform 
markets, it accounts for the diversity of platform definitions and platform 
types identified in theory and, especially, in practice. Here it is important 
to understand the general principles behind the functioning of platform 
markets, especially, digital ones. A more detailed review of different plat-
form market typologies and of practical cases can be found in many 
works (see, for instance, [12; 15]). 
Two key elements of platforms — technologies and institutions — 
are easily identified from their digital footprint. The major factors are the 
critical mass of agents using the platform, i. e. the technological and 
institutional rate of expansion, agents’ reputations, and — most impor-
tantly — the proportion of member agents in the population. Naturally, 
attention of general public is drawn to platforms of a potential national 
and (or) global scope. 
To a great extent, the theory of platform development is a generalisa-
tion of models describing competition between technological standards. 
Like platform competition, standard competition has been studied since 
the dawn of the digital era [16; 17]. Later sources of authority considered 
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platforms as an independent module of the general intermediation theory 
[14]. A qualitative and profound shift in the understanding of platform 
economy occurred with the spread of wireless network standards and mo-
bile electronic devices. However, the expansion of industrial platforms — 
mainly those related to additive manufacturing and full product lifecycle 
management — is of greater importance for meoseconomic production 
systems. 
Platform markets present a serious challenge to regional and spatial 
studies [18], and the authors of the anniversary review for the Regional 
Studies journal emphasised inconsistencies and uncertainties in the 
current regional studies agenda. This is largely explained by the platform-
based spread of technology and institutions. Some authors also speak of 
‘virtual geographies’ [2]. I believe that the very notion of technological 
leadership is moving from cluster model towards that of dominant plat-
forms, which consider not only production capabilities but also cohesion 
between agents using different production and sales platforms and 
integrating customers into their platforms. 
Although platforms have a rather weak connection to traditional 
geographical space, the positioning of largest global platform operators’ 
headquarters still follows the traditional principles of agglomeration and 
concentration around global cities and established centres of technology 
[4, p. 12]. 
Regional development is increasingly affected by complex flows of 
information and finances, whose sources and transmitters are not only 
large multinational corporations but also diverse economic groups of 
agents consisting of small and medium-sized companies brought together 
by a platform [1]. 
 
Platform markets in the mesoeconomic system typology 
 
In a broad sense, mesoeconomics studies the evolution of economic 
groups and thus it is affected by sectoral, spatial, and institutional 
economics. Note that mesoeconomics is not a subsidiary discipline, like 
micro- and macroeconomics [19]. Mesoeconomics is an interdisciplinary 
area that studies diverse groups of economic agents — groups emerging 
in the competition between generic rules adopted by such agents [8]. This 
area deals not only with competition between agents but also with 
competition between, and the evolution of, groups. 
Studies of groups are complicated by the need to consider at least two 
levels of the system — the level of individual microeconomic agents and 
that of their associations. Competition between groups depends on the 
viability of grouping rules2. 
                                                     
2 This process reminds of evolutionary biology and of the emergence of ideas 
about the role of two-tier systems of evolution (the traditional species — organism 
system or the carrier — replicator opposition at a different conceptual level) [20].  
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As the views on key factors determining competitiveness evolve, the 
idea of what group objects should be studied by researchers and practi-
tioners is changing. 
Traditionally, it was believed that the main factors influencing socio-
economic evolution and competitiveness were location and technology. 
A more recent view introduces the concept of institutions as a new factor 
affecting competitiveness. Thus, contemporary approach to mesoecono-
mic system studies gives equal value to three consolidated factors — lo-
cation, technology, and institutions. 
As shown in Table 1, one can distinguish between two large catego-
ries in the typology of mesoeconomic systems, depending on the number 
of actors used to identify these categories.3 
 
Table 1  
 
Key development factors and relevant types  
of mesoeconomic systems 
 
System 
Factor group 
Location 
(space) Technology Institutions 
Agglomeration +   
Sector  +  
Conglomerate   + 
Zone +  + 
Complex/cluster + +  
Platform  + + 
 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
One-factor systems are agglomerations, sectors, and conglomerates. 
Two-factor systems are of special interest: as one can see, platform 
markets are important elements in the typology of mesoeconomic systems. 
Economic zones are the most obvious institutional-spatial systems 
(second to sectors, which are studied within industrial organisation). 
Zones develop under the influence of exogenous regulatory institutions 
that distort initial incentives. 
                                                     
3 Networks are not included in the typology, since network analysis is consid-
ered as a universal means (language) to describe a system (integrated objects 
consisting of elements and connections between them). In this sense, any 
mesoeconomic system can be modelled as a network. It is also possible to study 
relevant network effects. (For more detail on the network structure of economy, 
see [21]). 
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Cluster is the focus of spatial studies. In my earlier works, I conside-
red the differences between cluster and complex models [22] and the role 
of institutions with the cluster approach [23]. I largely agree that endoge-
nous location-specific institutions are key to the formation of clusters Ho-
wever, these institutions are poorly formalised and lack tangibility, which 
makes this factor inferior to location and technology. Thus, I define clus-
ters/complexes as primarily spatial and technological systems, with a 
weak institutional factor being a distinguishing characteristic of clusters. 
Platforms are institutional-technological systems, within which it is 
possible to identify (or formalise) both a technological and an institutio-
nal component. The latter is of greater importance, since platform-based 
formalisation of institutions is happening at an unprecedented rate. 
Whether three-factor systems are possible is an open question. For a 
long time, clusters were thought to be such systems. However, they lack 
pronounced institutional characteristics, which are present in conglome-
rates, zones, and platform markets. The prototypes of such systems are 
smart cities. 
Early attempts to derive a theory of inter-firm groups from such an 
understanding of the role of institutions did not make it possible to ‘cap-
ture’ the institutions themselves. Similarly, pre-digital two-sided markets 
did not give the whole picture of the scale and rate at which global digital 
platforms were developing. Digitising is not a sine qua non for the 
emergence of platforms but it is a necessary tool for the formalisation of 
the platform functioning rules and an efficient use of the transaction 
history. 
Thus, there are two key elements attributed to the competitive advan-
tages of digital platform markets: 
1) Platforms make it possible to formalise institutions digitally. Plat-
forms have memory and can store the history of transactions (interactions 
between users). 
2) Platforms can derive information about producers and consumers, 
which translates into a more efficient use of resources. 
Within platforms, information technology has solidified the features 
crucial for the evolution of institutions, i. e. the accessibility of the whole 
agent population and the capacity to store the history of both economic 
and social transactions.4 The way information technology affects the de-
termination of preferences deserves a special study. In their research on 
psychometrics, M. Kosinski et al. have shown that identification of con-
sumer preferences and modelling of choices can employ a machine 
learning-based consumer classification [24]. 
                                                     
4 Interestingly, emerging digital platform-based entities are embracing termino-
logy developed within institutions studies (consensus management, smart con-
tracts, transaction management, voting models, etc.). 
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These characteristics — established rules (for instance, those for 
joining a platform), stable game equilibria, and direct and indirect rule 
enforcement mechanisms — reveal the institutional nature of platforms. 
In case of a violation, an agent can be banished from the platform. At the 
same time, contract formalisation makes such violations next to impos-
sible, since many platforms computerise transactions and contract rela-
tions, which are controlled by a program code. 
Joining a new platform should be beneficial for an individual [3]. 
Having joined a platform, individuals do not have any incentive to disre-
gard its rules because platform users grow accustomed to its routines. 
The history of agents’ reputation (the quality of their products and ser-
vices) is being built in the framework of a platform. Such histories have 
independent value and contribute to the emergence of new markets that 
are based on information and data dissemination. 
 
A comparison of two-factor mesoeconomic systems 
 
The theoretical framework presented in Table 1 helps to develop a 
comprehensive picture of the evolution of two-factor systems — zones, 
clusters, and platforms. 
Table 2 offers a comparative analysis of such systems, which is based 
on tailor-made criteria pertaining to the system’s theoretical framework 
and contribution to regulatory interactions. Two-factor mesoeconomic 
systems have become the major object of study within the current 
industrial policy. This is explained by a recent shift from individual and 
sectoral support instruments to those supporting groups. 
 
Table 2 
 
Competitive characteristics  
of two-factor mesoeconomic system development 
 
Characteristic Zone Cluster Platform 
Generic term Regulation, conces-
sions 
One-sided markets, 
competition 
Two-sided markets, 
standards 
Boundaries  Precise, accurate 
to an agent or a lo-
cation 
Fuzzy Precise, accurate to 
a transaction 
An established eco-
nomic framework 
None; influenced 
by the regulation 
theory  
None; influenced by 
the input-output the-
ory 
Present; two-sided 
market (platform) 
theory 
Grounds for theo-
retical feasibility 
The possibility of 
pricing arbitration, 
tax recovery  
Probably, (agglome-
ration) externalities
Network externali-
ties (indirect) 
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End of table 2 
 
Characteristic Zone Cluster Platform 
Identification 
method 
Deduction Induction Induction / Deduc-
tion 
Negative factors An institutional trap, 
should concessions 
be abolished 
An institutional trap, 
should competitive 
positions be lost 
A tendency towards 
monopolisation and 
inequality 
Restrictive policy 
potential 
High; at the level 
of statutory instru-
ments 
Restrictions are not 
advisable 
Limited; at the le-
vel of prohibition 
and control 
The role of public 
support 
Central Not proven Not apparent 
The role of the sta-
te in the launch 
‘from scratch’ 
Central — statuto-
ry mechanisms and 
investment in infra-
structure 
Indirect — infrast-
ructure and statuto-
ry instruments 
Public-private plat-
forms within a sing-
le jurisdiction are 
possible 
Influence on the 
stakeholders’ ho-
me region 
Considerable, par-
tly because of incen-
tive distortion 
Considerable and po-
sitive 
Not proven, probab-
ly, positive 
 
Source: compiled by the author. 
 
In my opinion, platforms were the missing element in the typology. 
Having emerged within industrial organisation, they surpassed the limits 
of the theory that focuses mainly on pricing decisions and anti-monopoly 
practices [17]. 
The most successful platforms have turned into global mesoeconomic 
systems that affect the macroeconomic performance of not only indivi-
dual regions but also that of the global economy. Some studies attribute 
global deceleration of inflation to the expansion of digital e-commerce 
platforms (i. e. the reduction in the transaction costs of the search for the 
best deals) [25]. 
Although the major platforms studied specialise in the modernisation 
of service industries, the basis for industrial modernisation is formed by 
the industrial Internet of Things platforms (innovative platforms, accor-
ding to Evans and Gawer’s classification [4]). These bring together pro-
ducers and developers of engineering design systems. New platforms’ 
technology makes it possible to combine engineering and physical mo-
dels and create digital twins of actual systems and products at all life-
cycle stages [26]. Such platforms provide for more flexible small-batch 
production and bring manufacturing closer to the consumer [1]. In the 
future, they will erode cluster model of industrial organisation even 
further. 
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Conclusions 
 
Many theories of economic system development based on sectoral 
and spatial concepts were rather limited due to the weakness of 
institutional factors. The expansion of global platform markets brings in 
an important link — institutional technological systems that are 
independent of a concrete location but have powerful mechanisms for the 
formalisation of rules and standards. 
Platform markets empowered by information and new production 
technology have everything for the formalisation and functioning of 
institutional mechanisms. Moreover, platform markets determine prefe-
rences and store transactions histories. Platforms formulate systems of ru-
les and mechanisms that encourage agents to accept, support, and de-
velop the rules and technology standards. 
A by-product of platform emergence is the industry of socioeconomic 
big data that is owned by platform operators. This poses a serious 
methodological problem for traditional socioeconomic research methods 
(geographical and statistical measurements, surveys, etc.), since big data 
is undermining the value of such methods. 
The development of information technology made platform markets a 
phenomenon of global consequence [1]. Their presence is so formidable 
that they affect the actual public policies across many regions and 
countries [6]. I believe that platform markets will gradually replace clus-
ter approach. In effect, platform markets differ from clusters quite sub-
stantially. 
1) Platforms have a developed theoretical framework and they are 
identified more easily than clusters. 
2) Platforms make it possible to formalise institutions digitally. 
They have institutional memory and can store the whole history of 
transactions (interactions between users). 
3) Platforms can derive information on producers and consumers, 
thus making the use of resources more efficient. 
4) Platforms contribute to the tendency towards monopolisation and 
inequality. 
5) States can take an active part in platform regulation (and create 
public-private platforms). 
The effect that platform markets will have on spatial economics and 
location of production is still unclear, and the most urgent research 
problems pertain to the three aspects of platform market functioning. 
These are: 
1) Spatial consequences of platform development; formation of 
three-factor economic systems where location, technology, and institu-
tions are of equal importance; 
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2) Consequences of the global dominance of industrial platforms for 
traditional clusters; an analysis of the consequences of computerisation, 
additive technology, and the dwindling the role of narrow local labour 
markets (the role of the human in production); 
3) Changes in the public policy on the platform economy; studies 
into how public policy can and should contribute to the development of 
emerging and established platforms. 
It is likely that the role of economic zoning and clustering will reduce 
and that the cluster approach employed at the local level and the global 
development of platform technology will escalate competition at the level 
of advanced agglomerations (today, they are referred to as smart cities). 
A more complete substantiation of, or revisions to, this hypothesis will 
require a larger body of observations and a more developed conceptual 
and analytical framework. 
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